1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN		
2	SOUTHERN DIVISION		
3	IN THE MATTER OF,	Case No. 13-53846 Detroit, Michigan	
4	CITY OF DETROIT, MI	August 5, 2015 2:13 p.m.	
5			
6	IN RE: BENCH OPINION RE: (#9970) CITY OF DETROIT'S MOTION FOR THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER (I) ENFORCING THE PLAN OF ADJUSTMENT INJUNCTION AND (II) REQUIRING THE DISMISSAL OF THE STATE COURT		
7	ACTION FILED BY TANYA HUGHES, AND EXPEDITED HEARING RE:  (#10087) CITY OF DETROIT'S MOTION FOR THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER		
8	(I) ENFORCING THE PLAN OF ADJUSTMENT INJUNCTION AND (II) REQUIRING B & C LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION TO (A) DISMISS		
9	WITH PREJUDICE ITS STATE COURT LAWSUIT AND (B) WITHDRAW ITS  NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS.		
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE THOMAS J. TUCKER TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: ROBIN WYSOCKI		
11			
12	APPEARANCES:		
12	For the City of Detroit, MI:	MARC SWANSON, ESQ. (P71149)	
13		JONATHAN GREEN, ESQ. (P33140) Miller, Canfield, Paddock &	
14		Stone 150 West Jefferson	
15		Suite 2500	
		Detroit, MI 48226	
16		313-496-7591	
17	For Tanya Hughes:	JEFFREY ELLISON, ESQ. (P35735) 214 S. Main Street	
18		Suite 210	
19		Ann Arbor, MI 48104 734-761-4300	
20		734-528-4159	
21	For B & C Land Development Corporation:	HORACE COTTON, ESQ. (P33268) P.O. Box 19520	
22		Detroit, MI 48226 313-595-1517	
23	Court Recorder:	Jamie Laskaska	
24	Transcriber:	Deborah L. Kremlick	
0 -	Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript		
25 produced by transcription service. 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 1 of 39			

(Court in Session)

THE COURT: All right. We'll we're ready to call the City of Detroit case and the matters we have scheduled for -- in that case today.

THE CLERK: The Court calls the City of Detroit,
Michigan. Case number 13-53846.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. Let's have appearances, please.

MR. SWANSON: Your Honor, it's Marc Swanson and Jonathan Green on behalf of the debtor the City of Detroit.

MR. ELLISON: Afternoon, Your Honor. Jeffrey Ellison for Tanya Hughes.

THE COURT: All right. We have two matters scheduled for hearing today, one of which is the Tanya Hughes matter. So we will go ahead with that first. And it's listed as the first matter anyway on the Court's calendar.

So this is a -- originally after the July 15<sup>th</sup> hearing the Court held in which the Court heard oral argument from counsel for these parties regarding the City of Detroit's motion for entry of an order enforcing the plan of adjustment and injunction, et cetera concerning the State Court action filed by Tanya Hughes.

The Court originally took the matter under advisement and said the Court would issue a bench opinion -- actually it came

25 under advisement when the supplement filings that the Court 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 2 of 39

ordered on July 15 were -- were filed. But the Court scheduled today for a bench opinion hearing to rule on the motion.

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Since that time as the parties know, the parties filed a stipulation asking the Court to enter an order permitting the debtor and Ms. Hughes through counsel to present as they put it, limited oral argument on the supplemental filings as defined in the stipulation today and I -- I granted that and entered the order granting that.

So we start at least with the -- some further oral argument regarding the city's motion which the parties wish to make in light of the supplemental filings that have been filed since the July  $15^{th}$  hearing and that's fine, we'll hear that. I'm not quaranteeing at this moment that I'm going to actually issue a bench ruling when you get done with that argument rather than doing it on another day, but we'll -- we'll see. So go ahead. We'll hear from the parties. I guess unless the parties have a different order in mind, we'll hear first from the debtor, the moving party.

MR. SWANSON: Thank you, Your Honor. And at least the city included the limited portion because it -- it -- it intends to be brief.

The -- the supplemental filings were attached to the city's supplement filed at docket number 10099 included the 25 police trial board decision which the Court requested, the 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 3 of 39 arbitration ruling, and then the relevant provisions of the CBA.

Additionally attached as Exhibit A to the stipulation filed at docket number 10109 was a proof of claim that was filed by the DPLSA on behalf of certain individual members including Ms. Hughes.

The city believes that these documents reinforce and support the city's position that the claim arose pre-petition, either under the debtor's conduct or the fair contemplation approach.

First, this claim is consistent with and supports the city's view that -- that this is a pre-petition claim. The claim shows that the claims arising from her termination were within the fair contemplation of her union and should also have been in the -- within her fair contemplation. Filing of the claim is exactly what should have happened and what in fact did happen.

And that -- in this regard the claim states on Exhibit 1B, that it was her termination for -- that the grievant was terminated for a refusal to submit to a drug screen. And on Exhibit 1 to the claim the -- it acknowledges that the claim is filed as a protective measure, in event that any of the claimants on the list attached hereto have monetary claims against the city arising from the resolution of the

Footnote 1 to Exhibit 1 also states that resolution of a disciplinary action may result in the DPLSA member having a claim against the city. That's exactly what is alleged here.

And -- and second, the city wanted to make clear that in light of this claim it's not asking for Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the relief requested in its original motion and has stipulated to that fact.

THE COURT: So basically what you're seeking now is only the --

MR. SWANSON: The --

THE COURT: The order that -- the injunctive provision regarding the State Court lawsuit.

MR. SWANSON: Yes. The only thing that we're seeking here today, Your Honor -- I guess two things. One, we're seeking a determination that the claim as alleged in the State Court lawsuit arose pre-petition. And that claim is enjoined or -- or Ms. Hughes to be exact, is enjoined from pursuing that claim under the plan injunctive provisions.

And we would seek an order which requires Ms. Hughes to dismiss her lawsuit against the city with prejudice and -- and she has whatever rights she and the DPLSA have under this proof of claim and -- and the city is not asking the Court to obviously make any sort of determination, or ruling, or -- or anything like that on -- on the claim. And that's all the

25 city has, Your Honor. Thank you. 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 5 of 39 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ellison.

MR. ELLISON: Yes. Thanks very much, Your Honor.

Your Honor posed a question during oral argument when we were last here as to whether this was a termination of Sergeant

Hughes that occurred in October or thereabouts of 2012, but a termination that could not be fully implemented until the arbitrator ruled, or was it instead an initiation of an effort to remove Sergeant Hughes from the work force that did not actually turn into a termination until the arbitrator ruled.

The distinction being that what -- what type of claim was -- or what type of action against Sergeant Hughes was initiated. And I think the documents that have been presented to Your Honor by stipulation bear on that question and demonstrate the she was not fired by the Chief of Police pre-petition. She was not fired until December 16 of 2014 which was after the eighth amended adjustment plan was approved by the Bankruptcy Court.

The -- the documents that bear this out, Your Honor, the trial board decision which is in transcript form, and this is docket number 10099 and it's Page 5 of the transcript. It says, quote -- it's a cover letter actually to the transcript.

It says, "attached hereto is the recommendation of the police trial board in the matter of Tanya Hughes. And the recommendation is that she be -- be dismissed from the Detroit

Then the transcript itself says on Page 8 of the filing beginning on Line 11, "as it relates to the decision of the trial board, I, commander James White as chairperson, recommend a penalty of dismissal from the Detroit Police Department".

So the -- the trial board itself is making a recommendation, they're not making a decision. The arbitrator's decision on Page 55 of the filing, Your Honor, again this is docket 10099, Page 55, the arbitrator's decision issued December 15, 2014, so nearly two years later following the trial board decision says, "in recommending the penalty of dismissal, the trial board considered the nature of the misconduct along with Sergeant Hughes' spotless disciplinary history".

And then the arbitrator went on to say, "considering the gravity of the charges, this arbitrator cannot find that the department violated concepts of just cause and reasonableness in reaching this determination".

Again, the -- the recommendation. So when did the recommendation turn into an actual decision. And I would submit to Your Honor that that happened when the arbitrator said that the recommendation was consistent with just cause.

If you take a look at the collective bargaining agreement provisions, Page 59 of the filing says that Article 5, Section

25 D, "the department reserves the right to discipline and 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 7 of 39

1 discharge for just cause". That is the contractual language 2 that gives the department the right to fire. Article 10, Section A --3 4 THE COURT: Wait a minute. I'm looking at Page 59. 5 MR. ELLISON: Yeah. THE COURT: Where is that? 6 7 MR. ELLISON: I -- I believe I have it right. 8 THE COURT: I'm sure it's there, but I just --9 MR. ELLISON: It's Section D, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Oh, I see. The first sentence in D. 11 MR. ELLISON: The first sentence, yes. And then on 12 Page 59, Your Honor, in Article 10, Section A(3), it lays out what the trial board's responsibility is. 13 14 It states, "the trial board shall serve an investigatory role. It will not issue a penalty but will make a penalty 15 16 recommendation to the Chief of Police; and the discipline 17 decision rendered in the chief's hearing shall be the final 18 ruling by senior management of the department". That's on Page 64 of the filing. 19 20 Now, there's nothing that's been submitted to Your Honor that the chief actually made a decision. And I --22 THE COURT: I was going to ask about that. I noticed the provision in the collective bargaining agreement 23 on Page 65, talks about Section 4, a chief's hearing and ends

25 up by saying the decision of the Chief of Police should be 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 8 of

final department administrative remedy. The Chief of Police shall notify the employee in writing forthwith. There's no such writing presented.

MR. ELLISON: Correct.

THE COURT: The parties don't have one? There isn't one?

MR. ELLISON: I believe there is not one, Your Honor. I believe that the chief did not issue anything in writing. And I think that is consistent with the appeal to arbitration which is at Article 9, Section A(1) which is on Page 61 of the filing.

And that says, "such written notice of intent to arbitrate must be made within 20 calendar days after receipt of the fourth step answer or trial board finding".

So the time for proceeding to arbitration runs from when the trial board makes its finding, not any appeal from a trial board to a chief's hearing. You note the language that you found on Page 65 of the filing that gives the chief the right to consider what the trial board has found, accept it in toto, modify it, reject it, conduct a new de novo proceeding himself if that's what the Chief of Police decides to do, yet the appeal to arbitration language doesn't run from what the chief does, it runs from what the trial board has done.

And so what we have in front of the Court is the trial

a recommendation of the trial board and the arbitrator determines based on that recommendation that the recommendation is consistent with just cause.

And the timing here, Your Honor, is the most important issue. The timing coming when the arbitrator rules and the -- the following day, December 16 of 2014 is the day that Sergeant Hughes for the first time suffers adverse employment action.

And I would submit, Your Honor, that based on this additional information that's been provided to the Court that the underlying act then converts to the determination of the arbitrator which is December 15 of 2014.

THE COURT: Is there actually a termination at all under the collective bargaining agreement terms before the Chief of Police has issued a written decision?

MR. ELLISON: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The Chief of Police makes the decision whether or not to terminate subject to whatever appeal rights there are. Without such a decision is there actually even a termination yet?

MR. ELLISON: As -- as of today --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ELLISON: -- Your Honor? Yes, there is, Your

Honor. When -- when the arbitrator issues the decision saying

25 that the recommendation of the trial board for dismissal is 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 10 of 39

1 consistent with just cause, the arbitrator says termination is 2 what happens. 3 THE COURT: Is that what this arbitrator said? 4 MR. ELLISON: Yeah. 5 THE COURT: Where did the arbitrator say the employee is terminated? 6 7 MR. ELLISON: The arbitrator says --8 THE COURT: It says a dismissal of Sergeant Hughes, 9 et cetera, is hereby affirmed. 10 MR. ELLISON: Correct. 11 THE COURT: If you think that's the -- that award 12 language, Page 44 of the arbitrator's decision when that was issued on December 15, 2014 that constitutes the moment in the 13 event of termination? 14 MR. ELLISON: That's correct, Your Honor. And prior 15 16 to that what we have under the language of the collective 17 bargaining agreement, again Article 10, Section A(3) on Page 18 64 is a referral to a trial board. 19 It indicates -- and I'll read the language rather than 20 attempt to recall it. "When serious charges are made against 21 an employee, and again this is the second sentence of that section, "when serious charges are made against an employee, 22 23 the matter may be referred to a trial board". 24 So that's without a determination being made. It's just

25 a serious charge. Disciplinary administration section, 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 11 of 39

perhaps the Chief of Police, whoever it is that determines whether charges are serious within the meaning of that language, it's clearly a department function.

But once it's referred to the trial board, then the trial board language takes over and that gives the trial board the right to investigate, but not issue a penalty. They can make a recommendation, but -- but can't issue the penalty.

So the determination of dismissal happens December 15 of 2014 when the arbitrator rules and the -- the decision that the arbitrator issues on that date is implemented the next day, December 16. And that's the day that Sergeant Hughes is removed from the payroll.

Now with respect to the claim that's filed by the DPLSA,
Your Honor may be aware of some of the background information
that gave rise to that claim. There was a stipulation entered
into between the city and various public safety unions which
is docket number 2667 filed February 7 of 2014 concerning —
the principal concern there related to defense and
indemnification claims.

When an officer is accused of conduct giving rise to an injury to a citizen known in common parlance as police brutality for instance, the -- the citizen will sue the officer and will also sue the city. The officer of course is not in bankruptcy. The officer has a claim against the city

of Detroit.

And the public safety unions were concerned that the officers who face potential claims would be left high and dry without defense and indemnification. And so this stipulation was reached through mediation and resulted in an order which is docket number 2678 which gave the public safety unions the right to file omnibus claims on behalf of any member of their associations that they could identify for a potential defense and indemnification. And again —

THE COURT: But that's not what the claim is that was filed by --

MR. ELLISON: I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Excuse me, by the association on behalf of Tanya Hughes.

MR. ELLISON: Right. But --

THE COURT: It says nothing about indemnification.

MR. ELLISON: There -- there is a -- there is a paragraph within the stipulation. Sub paragraph H on Page 4 of the stipulation. It's -- and again the stipulation is docket 2667.

That states, "there also are potential claims of public safety union members as a result of disciplinary action instituted against such member by the city". And the paragraph goes on, and the -- the stipulation thus gave --

25 gave the public safety unions the right to file claims on 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 13 of 39

behalf of any person within their individual associations that was facing potential disciplinary action.

And the claim that was filed by the DPLSA related to disciplinary action. I believe Your Honor has as part of this record, listing three individuals, Victor Jones, Tanya Hughes, and Donald Johnson. Victor Jones, a discipline filed that commenced in calendar 2010. Tanya Hughes, a discipline filed that commenced in calendar 2012. And Donald Johnson, a demotion filed.

Donald Johnson had been an inspector represented by the Command Officer's Association. He had been demoted into the DPLSA and there was a proceeding pending seeking to get him re-promoted and get him the difference in the compensation between the two ranks.

As far as I can tell, the -- what -- what the DPLSA put in the claim with respect to Tanya Hughes, they asked for reinstatement and back pay. She -- she didn't need reinstatement at the time the claim was filed because she hadn't been dismissed. And she had no back pay due and owing to her because she was receiving full compensation in a suspended with pay status.

So I -- I think that the claim that was filed by the DPLSA does not go to the issue that's before Your Honor and that is whether it was within the fair contemplation of

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    Civil Rights Act for pregnancy discrimination or disability
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    discrimination arising from the order in October 2012 that she
    completely disrobe before delivering a urine specimen at a
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    drug testing event.
         Under the <u>Signature Combs</u> case as I've argued previously,
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    Your Honor, a claim for bankruptcy purposes arises if the
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   potential claimant knows that they have a claim and knowledge
    of that is acknowledged to a certainty. And here Sergeant
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    Hughes didn't know even if she was going to be fired as a
    result of this let alone whether she would have a claim under
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    the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act arising from such
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    dismissal.
              THE COURT: Well, Tanya Hughes did not sign this
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   proof of claim or file it?
              MR. ELLISON: Correct. And in fact we did not know
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    about it.
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              THE COURT: Is that correct?
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              MR. ELLISON: That is correct, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: She didn't do it.
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              MR. ELLISON: Sergeant Hughes didn't know about it.
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              THE COURT: It was -- it was filed by the Detroit
    Police Lieutenants and Sergeants Association.
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              MR. ELLISON: Correct.
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              THE COURT: Right? Under -- under an order of this
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that authorized that association to file claims like Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 15 of 39

1 this. 2 MR. ELLISON: Correct. THE COURT: And the proof of claim says in Exhibit 1 3 4 it's without prejudice to claimant's ability -- I'm sorry, there's something in the order or in the -- yeah, it says it's 5 -- it's without prejudice to the individual member to assert 6 7 claims on their own behalf. 8 MR. ELLISON: Correct. 9 THE COURT: All right. Well, what else did you want 10 to say, anything? MR. ELLISON: That's all I have, Your Honor. 11 Thank 12 you. 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Swanson, as usual as counsel for the moving party, I'll let you briefly 14 reply if you want to. Anything further you'd like to say? 16 MR. SWANSON: Thank you, Your Honor. I think we 17 need to -- to go back to the definition of -- of claim under 18 the Bankruptcy Code. And -- and realize that Congress broadly defined claim and gave it the broadest possible definition. 19 20 When the termination was filed and when it occurred is -is not all together relevant here. We know that the conduct occurred pre-petition, there were numerous proceedings 22 23 initiated pre-petition, and this claim was within Ms. Hughes' fair contemplation before the filing of the case. Thank you.

25 | THE COURT: All right. Thank you both. 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 16 of 39

1 I'm -- I'm not going to issue a bench opinion at this 2 moment ruling on this motion or the -- the motion as it has now been modified in terms of the relief the city is -- is 3 4 seeking. Instead I'm going to schedule this for a bench 5 opinion to be given on the next day when I have City of Detroit hearings which is August 26 at 1:30 p.m. 6 7 I've got a couple of matters in this case already scheduled for that day. I'm out of town much of the next two 9 weeks anyway. So I couldn't really do it before then. I do want to take a bit more time to think about the 10 arguments of the parties and the authorities the parties cite 11 12 and the issues here before ruling. But I'll -- I'll do it on August 26 at 1:30. Now, does that date and time work on 13 14 counsels' calendars. Mr. Swanson, Mr. Ellison. 15 MR. ELLISON: Yes, Your Honor. For Tanya Hughes it 16 does. 17 MR. SWANSON: Your Honor, I -- I cannot make it here that day but -- but Mr. Green will be here. THE COURT: Oh, okay. So the city has no problem 19 20 with me doing it then as opposed to --21 MR. SWANSON: No problem. THE COURT: All right. Okay, very good. So that's 22 -- that's it for today on that matter. The -- let's hear the 23

25 Detroit's motion concerning B & C Land Development and its 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 17 of 39

next matter which is the expedited hearing on the City of

lawsuit in State Court.

`All right. This hearing on the city's motion is docket number 10087. The motion for entry of an order enforcing the plan of adjustment injunction and requiring B & C Land Development Corporation to dismiss with prejudice its State Court lawsuit and withdraw its notice of lis pendens.

I -- I did review the papers filed by the parties concerning this motion and their exhibits. We'll start with counsel for the moving party. Mr. Swanson, you're going to argue it?

MR. SWANSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's have appearances. You've already entered an appearance. Counsel for B & C.

MR. COTTON: May it please the Court, Horace Cotton appearing on behalf of B & C.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Good afternoon to everyone. Go ahead then, Mr. Swanson.

MR. SWANSON: Thank you, Your Honor. The matters in dispute here are one, does B & C Land have a contract with the city. Did it ever have a contract with the city.

And two, if this Court were to find that there was a contract which the city does not believe is the case, is B & C Land prohibited from suing on that contract because it's

25 | barred by the Michigan statute of limitations 13-53846-tjt | Doc 10126 | Filed 08/09/15 | Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 | Page 18 of 39

If this Court were to answer either of these questions in the city's favor, the Court should enter the order requiring the dismissal of the State Court lawsuit and the withdrawal of the lis pendens.

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THE COURT: Was the lis pendens notice filed only in the Circuit Court in the lawsuit, or was it filed separately in the Register of Deeds office? Do you know?

> MR. SWANSON: I don't know, Your Honor. I would --THE COURT: Okay. Well, go ahead.

MR. SWANSON: Your Honor, I wanted to provide a little background on -- on this piece of property and -- and the facts at least as B & C has -- has alleged them to be.

First though, B & C alleges that there was a contract in -- in 2006 between the city and B & C to sell real property. B & C alleges that on May 21, 2008, the contract was breached because that property which was subject to the alleged contract was instead transferred to the Detroit Waterage or --Detroit Water Sewerage Department, the DWSD.

Now in February of 2015, the city received two purchase offers for this property and on June  $30^{th}$ , 2015, the Detroit city council passed resolutions approving both of these purchase offers -- offers. And the Mayor has subsequently approved them as well.

The city and the purchasers desired to complete the sale 25 of these properties as soon as possible and the day after 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 19

city council approved these resolutions B & C filed a complaint in Wayne County Circuit Court alleging that it had a contract to purchase the same property that was approved by city council and -- and sued for breach of contract.

Now, Your Honor, B & C does not have a contract and it has never had a contract with the City of Detroit. To support its argument that there is a contract, B & C attached a cover letter and a document entitled offer to purchase. These documents appear at docket number 10087 from Pages 35 to 43.

The cover letter to the offer to purchase is instructive and -- and important. Because it provides on Page 3, upon receipt of the above, referring to the offer to purchase, we shall review your proposed development package. If acceptable, we shall follow our standard procedure for sale of surplus property by development agreement to obtain city council authorization to execute an agreement to purchase and develop the property.

Now this language was included on the cover letter, Your Honor, because the city's charter provides in Section 4-112 that "except as otherwise provided by this charter, the city may not sell or in any way dispose of any property without the approval by resolution of city council".

And, Your Honor, city council never approved this offer to purchase. And B & C does not allege otherwise. In fact,

25 Your Honor, what may be most telling is that in Paragraph 26 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 20 of 39

of B & C's own complaint, it says that the city breached the purported contract by "failing and refusing to present the development agreement to city council for final approval".

This -- this conclusion is also supported by the declaration of Mr. James Noseda who filed a declaration in support of the city's reply where he certified that he has searched the city council records for resolutions on -- on this piece of property and there has never been a resolution approving any sale of property -- any sale of this property to B & C or its President Mr. Carmack.

Your Honor, this is not the first time that B & C has — has — has alleged that they're — alleged that they're a party to a contract with the city. And as we attached as an Exhibit 6D to our original motion, the city has consistently maintained over the years that there is not a contract and that there has never been a contract.

In fact in May 2012, Robert A. Anderson, the director of the city's planning and development department issued a public statement to the Detroit city council. Because Mr. Carmack has repeatedly been in front of the city council alleging that he had a contract.

When he explained that P & DD never took a deposit, the planning and development department never took a deposit from Mr. Carmack for the site, never entered into a purchase

25 | agreement with Mr. Carmack for the site, and never entered 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 21 of 39

into a development agreement with Mr. Carmack for the site.

Planning and development department never requested that this honorable body approve any sale of the site to Mr.

Carmack and your honorable body never passed a land sale resolution or authorized the sale of the property to Mr.

Carmack.

Thus, Your Honor, the law provides that for the offer to purchase to be a valid contract the city council had to approve it. The facts here are undisputed that the city council never approved the contract thus the only conclusion that this Court could reach is that there is no contract.

THE COURT: And therefore you're saying there was no executory contract to be assumed or rejected or otherwise treated under the plan or otherwise.

MR. SWANSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I -- I gather from that also that you're arguing that to the extent there is -- there are any claims based on these pre-petition events other than a breach of contract claim and that's -- I don't -- I'm not sure that's -- any such other claims are asserted in the complaint in State Court, that those are clearly pre-petition claims that are covered by the plan's discharge and injunction relief.

MR. SWANSON: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, go on.

believes there's overwhelming evidence here that there is no contract if -- if the Court were to find a contract again by B & C's own admissions, the statute of limitations period to enforce that contract has run.

As I stated in -- in -- in my introduction, B & C alleges that on May 21, 2008, the city breached this alleged contract by transferring the subject property to the DWSD. And -- and there are certainly allegations in the complaint which would support a conclusion that -- that B & C is alleging that the breach occurred at -- at an earlier date.

But even if we take the farthest possible date May 21, 2008 as alleged by B & C, if you apply a six year statute of limitations which applies to contracts and contracts to purchase real property, the statute would have run during the city's bankruptcy case under 108(c) would have been extended for a period of 30 days after the effective date. Which means the statute ran on January 9<sup>th</sup>, 2015. Thus B & C is barred from suing on this contract under the statute of limitations.

The city asks that the Court grant its motion and order that B & C dismiss the State Court lawsuit and withdraw the lis pendens. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Cotton.

MR. COTTON: Your Honor, B & C maintains that the offer to purchase which was accompanied by a \$50,000 good

25 | faith deposit, as well as full blown development plans 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 23 of 39

including feasibility studies, market studies, environmental studies, architectural drawings, et cetera which were prepared by B & C at great expense as required by the City of Detroit that was and is a binding contract with the City of Detroit even though it had been -- and we agree that it was never presented to council by -- to -- to obtain a resolution for entry into a development agreement.

And it is also true that Mr. Carmack has tried repeatedly over the years to convince council that he had a -- an offer to purchase which should be considered by that body to pass a resolution to enter into a development agreement.

The city argues that Mr. Anderson, I believe, appeared before council and -- and made certain representations that planning and development never took a deposit from Mr. Carmack. Well, that was false. They had never entered into a purchase agreement. That was false.

Part of the problem is that over the last few years given Detroit's former Mayor and his administration being of course embroiled in controversy and eventually convicted, over the years there were a series of Mayors and -- and directors of planning and development.

And under each administration they each told council something different and contradictory. And the crux of the matter is that Mr. Carmack who was accompanying me at the

Development, was solicited for a bribe and refused to cooperate. And it was then that his proposal was killed, or I don't want to say killed, it was buried and was never presented to council. In the meantime he spent thousands of dollars in preparation for the offer.

Now the city wants to argue that if there was a contract that it was breached when the property was originally transferred to the control or the authority of water and sewerage. Well, we disagree. We disagree. Because water and sewerage never paid for the property and the property was transferred back under the jurisdiction of planning and development by resolution.

It is our position that this contract was not breached until May  $31^{\rm st}$  of 2015 when the city agreed to sell portions of the property to water -- excuse me, Waterfront Terminal Holdings and Revere Dock, two separate purchasers.

And mind you of course that they're only selling a portion of the -- the total property. The Court also asked a question as to whether or not the lis pendens was filed with the treasurer -- excuse me, Register of Deeds and it has been.

THE COURT: Was that done at the same time you filed the lawsuit?

MR. COTTON: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

25 MR. COTTON: So it's our position that this contract 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 25 of 39

was in fact executory. It is not rejected by the city in the
plan of adjustment. And we cited cases which indicates that
it -- because it is not rejected it continues in existence.

It was not breached until recently -- recently here
post-petition and therefore it does not violate the
injunction. We therefore ask this Court to deny the city's
motion.

THE COURT: You contend this contract that you say existed was breached by the city post-petition only recently. By that are you referring to the city's actions in moving forward with sale of the property to the two other purchasers recently?

MR. COTTON: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Cotton, what -what's your response to the city's argument that there is no
contract under applicable Michigan law because the city
charter required a resolution by the city council approving
the sale in order for there to be a valid contract.

MR. COTTON: There is no -- there is no development agreement. There is not a -- a separate purchase agreement which is a separate document. But the offer to purchase accepted by the city is a valid contract under common law.

THE COURT: A contract to sell the property.

MR. COTTON: Yes.

25 | THE COURT: So how is it a valid contract to sell 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 26 of 39

the property, this city owned property when there was no -never a city council resolution approving that sale.

I'm looking at Section 4-112 of the city charter. It says except as otherwise provided by this charter, the city may not sell or in any way dispose of any property without the approval by resolution of the city council.

Now under that charter provision under the case law cited by the city, doesn't that mean that the fact there was no city council approval by resolution, doesn't that mean there was never a -- a valid contract between the city and B & C for the sale of this property?

MR. COTTON: I am -- I am aware of the charter provision as well as the case law. As a matter of fact I'm a former city employee. However, the offer to purchase we maintain is still a binding contract between B & C and the City of Detroit that's separate and distinct from the -- if I might take a second. One second, please.

Attached to the city's motion itself is a copy of the purchase agreement between Waterfront Terminal and the City of Detroit. Now that is an example of the formal purchase agreement typically used by the City of Detroit to sell surplus land.

It's the same type of agreement that was used for the other purchaser, Revere. The -- so that -- that's the formal

25 purchase agreement. The process of selling surplus property L3-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 27 of 39

is that the  $\--$  the city first enters into a binding agreement with the developer.

And that agreement is binding. Were it for the bankruptcy and had this just arisen, it would go into State Court if the city breached the offer to purchase and turned around and sold it to another person. And the city at that time would attempt to argue that it's not binding because it's — it hasn't gone before council. But the offer to purchase is a binding legal document that gives B & C enforceable rights separate from and before the issuance of a formal purchase agreement authorized by the — by council. Those are two separate and distinct matters.

THE COURT: Well, but your theory is that the offer to purchase when accepted you said that was accepted by city personnel.

MR. COTTON: Yes.

THE COURT: Your theory is that is a binding contract for the sale by the city to B & C of the real estate which is the subject of the agreement.

MR. COTTON: Yes.

THE COURT: What I'm trying to understand is why you -- why you are -- why you say that is so under Michigan law given the city charter provisions and the case law to -- that the city has cited here. And given the fact that is

25 undisputed that the city council -- 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 28 of 39

1 MR. COTTON: Excuse me. 2 THE COURT: Detroit city council has never approved the sale of any of this property to your client by a 3 4 resolution as required by the city charter. Why doesn't that 5 mean that there -- there never was a valid or a binding contract for the sale of any of this property between the city 6 7 and your client. 8 MR. COTTON: I would -- I would pose the question back to the city then what -- what is the purpose and effect 9 of -- of -- of executing an offer to purchase. What it does 10 is it supposedly it ties up the land so that the -- the -- the 11 12 city will not negotiate with or -- or sell the property to any 13 other entity. So it -- it -- it has legal effect as a 14 contract. And the city is bound by it. I think if -- that's about all I have to say on that issue, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. Did you want to say anything 17 else then? MR. COTTON: No. I think that's sufficient. 18 19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 20 MR. COTTON: Thank you. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Swanson, you may briefly reply as 22 counsel for the moving party if you want to. 23 MR. SWANSON: Your Honor, what -- what we haven't heard from B & C Land is that the contract was ever approved

city council or that it didn't need to be approved local Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 29 of

city council under the law. That's because it -- it never was approved by city council. And -- and it had to be approved by city council under the charter.

Second, Your Honor, B & C stated it -- it hasn't alleged a -- a breach of contract on May 21, 2008. If you look at Paragraph 26 of the complaint it says, Detroit breached its obligations under the purchase agreement by failing and refusing to cooperate and negotiate in good faith.

Specifically Detroit has violated the purchase agreement by number three, conveying the property to the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department after the property was under contract to B & C. Paragraph 15 of the complaint states that that conveyance occurred on May 21, 2008. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you all. I'm going to rule on this motion now.

The city's motion before me today seeks in the form of the proposed order that's attached to the motion, an order of this Court requiring B & C Land Development Corporation to dismiss, or cause to be dismissed with prejudice, the specific lawsuit that it recently filed in the Wayne County Circuit Court against the city that's referred to in the motion.

And also to withdraw from the Wayne County Register of Deeds the notice of lis pendens that the B & C Land Development Corporation filed. The city also seeks in its

25 order, an order from the Court barring and enjoining B & C 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 30 of 39

Land Development Corporation from asserting any claims described in the State Court lawsuit, a copy of the complaint in the State Court lawsuit filed in the Wayne County Circuit Court is attached as an exhibit to the city's motion, or the alleged conduct forming the basis of the State Court lawsuit against the City of Detroit or its property in the State Court lawsuit or in any other action or proceeding.

The city's proposed order also has the Court -- asks the Court to order that if B & C Land Development Corporation fails to timely withdraw the notice of lis pendens that I referred to earlier, the city may file a copy of the Court's order with the Register of Deeds which will operate as a withdrawal of the lis pendens on the property.

I -- I have reviewed and considered carefully the arguments of the parties with -- regarding this motion, both the written papers and exhibits filed by the parties, and the arguments made in today's expedited hearing on the motion.

And -- and my conclusion is that the motion must be granted in its entirety and I will do so.

The -- the B & C Land Development Corporation's argument in defense against the city's motion that it had as of the filing of the City of Detroit's bankruptcy petition in this Chapter 9 bankruptcy case, that is as of July 18, 2013, the petition date in this case. That -- that as of that time the

with the City of Detroit for the purchase by B & C Land

Development from the city of the real estate which is the subject of the city's motion and of the State Court lawsuit filed by B & C.

That that contract was an executory contract within the meaning of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC Section 365 which executory contract was never assumed or rejected by the city during its bankruptcy case and therefore survives the bankruptcy, the bankruptcy discharge, the bankruptcy plans, and the order confirming plan's injunctive provisions. And therefore B & C is entitled and -- and permitted to pursue their State Court lawsuit despite the city's confirmed Chapter 9 plan in this bankruptcy case.

The B & C's argument however is without merit based on undisputed facts. The undisputed facts include the fact that the B & C -- while B & C alleges that it -- that the offer to purchase document and perhaps other documents between itself and the city regarding this property at issue were valid and enforceable and binding contracts between B & C and the city, that is simply not the case under Michigan law.

It's not the case because as the case law cited by the city demonstrates, and the city charter provision cited by the city demonstrates, there can be under Michigan law no valid contract for the sale by the City of Detroit of any real

resolution of the city council of Detroit.

Section 4-112 of the city charter says, "that except as otherwise provided by this charter, the city may not sell or in any way dispose of any property without the approval by resolution of the city council".

That B & C has not argued that there are any exceptions in the city charter to this requirement that the city council approve any sale of its property by resolution that would apply to the property here. B & C has not argued otherwise and that argument by the city is supported by the affidavit that the city filed -- a declaration rather under penalty of perjury of the city's James Noseda, a member of this Detroit law department. That was attached as -- to the city's reply brief, docket 10115.

And so it is undisputed that under the City of Detroit charter a resolution by the Detroit city council approving the sale of the property was necessary in order for there to be the possibility of any existence of any valid binding, enforceable contract of any kind regarding the sale of this property at issue between the city and B & C Land Development.

It's also undisputed that there never was any such approval by city council by resolution as required by the city charter. Under the cases cited by the city the result of this is that there was -- there was and is -- there was never and

25 now is no contract, binding and enforceable contract between 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 33 of 39

the city and B & C Land Development.

The cases that support that proposition under Michigan law include the case of <u>Johnson v City of Menominee</u>, 173 Mich App 690, 434 NW 2d 211 and in particular at Pages 213 and 214, a decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals from 1989. And also the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 6<sup>th</sup> Circuit in applying Michigan law.

In the case of <u>Michigan Paytel Joint Venture v City of Detroit</u>, 287 F 3d 527, particularly at Page -- Pages 539 to 540, a decision of the 6<sup>th</sup> Circuit from 2002.

So there is no valid and never was a valid contract or any contract between -- enforceable contract between the city and B & C Land Development Corporation therefore -- therefore there could be no executory contract at any point and in particular as of the petition date in the Chapter 9 bankruptcy case within the meaning of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

So this -- so that B & C's argument that it has a -- an executory contract that -- that was never rejected in the bankruptcy and therefore survives the bankruptcy and the bankruptcy discharge and injunction in the confirmed plan is without merit. And the Court must reject that argument.

If and to the extent B & C Land Development can be construed as alleging in their State Court complaint that -- or in their argument in responding to the city's motion here,

25 that certain acts or omissions by the city give B & C a claim 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 34 of 39

under some legal theory with respect -- relating to this property under some legal theory other than breach of contract, a contract based theory such as a tort theory or some other type of theory other than contract or a theory that -- other than the theory that depends upon the existence of an enforceable and valid contract between the parties.

Those claims clearly are claims that arose before and — and well before the city filed its bankruptcy petition in this Chapter 9 case on July 18, 2013. And such claims therefore are discharged by the city's confirmed plan of adjustment and the discharge injunction provisions of the confirmed plan and of the Court's order confirming the plan bar B & C Land Development from pursuing those claims, either in State Court, or in the bankruptcy case, or anywhere else against the city or the city's property.

Those provisions -- and such -- any such claims were discharged under the confirmed plan. The provisions in the plan and the order confirming plan which the city has relied on and which support these conclusions are the discharge provision on Page 50 of the eighth amended plan which is on file and is part of docket 8272.

The injunction provisions in that confirmed plan which are on Pages 50 to 51 of the -- that same plan, docket 8272.

And the injunction provisions in the order confirming plan

25 that was filed in this case on November 12, 2014, docket 13-53846-tjt Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 35 of 39

number 8272 beginning at Page -- Page 89 of the order confirming plan.

For all these reasons then, B & C Land Development does not have any claim against the City of Detroit arising from or relating to any alleged agreement with the city regarding the property at issue and does not have any claims under any legal theory any that survive the bankruptcy case and the confirmation of the plan of adjustment in this case against the city and is subject to the injunction provisions enjoining them from pursuing any such claims by litigation or otherwise under the confirmed plan of adjustment.

Based on that the Court will grant the motion and will order the relief that the city has requested in the motion.

Mr. Swanson, do you have the proposed order in front of you?

MR. SWANSON: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's attached to your motion? I want to -- I want to talk to you about it. I want to talk about some changes, minor changes in the order.

The order says in Paragraphs 2 and 3 it sets a deadline for B & C to take certain action. It says within five days of the entry of this order. I'm not concerned about that -- that time frame, but instead of saying it that way in orders, I like to whenever possible to set a specific calendar date as a deadline.

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proposed order submitted to me yet today so that I can get it 1 2 filed yet today, we'll make it five days -- no later than five days after today's date, so that would be five days -- that 3 4 would be no later than next Monday, August 10th. I assume you 5 can get me this order --MR. SWANSON: Absolutely. 6 7 THE COURT: Submit this order today. I'm going to 8 waive presentment of the revised order. MR. SWANSON: Yes, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: All right. So make the date August 10, 10 no later than August 10, 2015, B & C Land Development 11 12 Corporation must dismiss, et cetera in Paragraph 2. Paragraph 3, they must withdraw the notice of lis pendens. Paragraph 4, 13 5, and 6 are fine as is. 14 I'll ask you to submit that order as soon as possible. 15 16 I'll waive presentment as I said. And I will make every 17 effort to review the order and get it docketed as quickly as I can after you submit it. 18 The -- I may make some minor non-substantive changes to 19 20 the order, but don't worry about those, I'll take care of that. And -- and as I said, they're -- they're entirely 21 22 non-substantive type things. 23 So, submit the order and the motion will be granted on that basis. That concludes today's matters on the City of

Detroit case. Thank you all. 346-tit Doc 10126 Filed 08/09/15 Entered 08/09/15 08:11:02 Page 37 of 39

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THE CLERK: All rise.
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                MR. SWANSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                MR. ELLISON: Thank you.
          (Court Adjourned at 3:14 p.m.)
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    We certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
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    electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the
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    above-entitled matter.
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    /s/Deborah L. Kremlick, CER-4872 Dated: 8-9-15
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    Jamie Laskaska
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